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Abstract 
This paper analyzes the implementation of correlated equilibria that are immune to joint deviations 
of coalitions by cheap-talk protocols. We construct a universal cheap-talk protocol (a polite protocol 
that uses only 2-player private channels) that is resistant to deviations of fewer than half the players, and 
using it, we show that a large set of correlated equilibria can be implemented as Nash equilibria in the 
extended game with cheap-talk. Furthermore, we demonstrate that in general there is no cheap-talk 
protocol that is resistant for deviations of half the players.  
 
 
JEL classification: C72 
Keywords: non-cooperative games, cheap-talk, correlated equilibrium, strong equilibrium, coalition-
proof equilibrium, fault-tolerant distributed computation.  
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1. Introduction 
    The self-enforcing outcomes of a "silent" game (with no communication) are the set of Nash 
equilibria (Nash, 1951). Pre-play mediated communication allows players to implement the larger set of 
correlated equilibria (Aumann, 1974, 1987). In many environments, it is hard to find a fair and discrete 
mediator, and it is natural to ask which agreements can be implemented using only cheap-talk: pre-play, 
unmediated, non-binding, non-verifiable communication among the players (See Crawford & Sobel, 
1982; Forges, 1990; Barany, 1992; Aumann & Hart, 2003; Gerardi, 2004, and the references within). In 
this paper we are going to extend two existing results: 
• Ben-Porath (2003): The existence of a cheap-talk protocol that allows three or more players to 
implement any Nash dominating correlated equilibrium as a Nash equilibrium of the extended game. 
• Ben-Porath (1998) and Krishna (2004): In general such a protocol does not exist for two players. 
In "silent" games, coalitional deviations might be considered improbable, due to not having a device 
to coordinate the joint deviation. However, cheap-talk is a natural coordination device. Resistance 
against coalitional deviations was discussed in Aumann (1959) and Bernheim et al. (1987), where 
strong Nash equilibrium was defined as a Nash equilibrium, which is resistant against a deviation of any 
coalition (i.e. there is no coalitional deviation that is profitable for all the deviators). Moreno & 
Wooders (1996) give the correlated counterpart definition: a strong correlated equilibrium.
2
 
In some real-world environments, while it is easy for small coalitions to deviate from an equilibrium, 
it is much harder for large coalitions to secretly coordinate a deviation while hiding it from the non-
deviating players.
3
 One example for such environment is the field of foreign affairs: there are no known 
examples of secret joint deviations of large coalitions (a few dozens countries), but there are secret joint 
deviations of small coalitions (a few countries), as in the following examples: 
• The secret additional protocol of Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact (1939) in which two countries have 
secretly divided between them six neighboring countries. 
•  The surprising joint attack of Egypt and Syria against Israel in 1973 October war. 
    We therefore introduce two new concepts:
4
 k-strong correlated equilibrium and k-strong Nash 
equilibrium, which require resistance against coalitional deviations of up to k players. We are 
                                                     
2 Alternative definitions can be found in Milgrom & Roberts (1996), Ray (1996, 1998), Einy & Peleg (1995) and Bloch & Dutta (2007).  
3 While it is true that a deviation of the grand coalition (all n players) may sometimes be easily coordinated, we would like to note that such 
a deviation does not threat any player (because everyone earns from it).  
4 Those concepts somewhat resemble Eliaz (1999) concept of k-Fault-Tolerant Nash Equilibrium. 
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interested in the question of existence of cheap-talk protocols that can implement a k-strong correlated 
equilibrium, as a k-strong Nash equilibrium in an extended game with cheap-talk. We would like to 
note that existing cheap-talk protocols (like Ben-Porath, 2003) can make such an implementation only 
for the case k=1. We say that a strategy profile q is k-strong punishable if there exists another strategy 
profile q~  that is dominated by q even when the players of a coalition with up to k players do a joint 
scheme (as defined formally in definition 2.5). Our main result is the existence of a general "minority-
proof" cheap-talk protocol (a finite polite protocol that uses only 2-player private channels) that for 
every 2nk < , can implement any k-strong correlated equilibrium (with rational parameters) which is 
k-strong punishable as a k-strong Nash equilibrium in the extended cheap-talk game. Furthermore, we 
prove that in general such a protocol does not exist when 2nk ≥ . Our protocol is based on the  
k-private protocol presented in Ben-Or et al. (1988), which deals with fault-tolerant distributed 
computation (as described in Section 3).  
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the model and formal definitions. Section 3 
presents the main result. Section 4 shows that in general there are no similar protocols when 2nk ≥ . 
Section 5 gives an example for the applicative use of our protocol. We conclude in Section 6.  
2. Model and Definitions 
A finite game in strategic form G is defined as ( , ( ) , ( ) )i ii N i NG N A u∈ ∈= , where {1,.., }N n=  is a 
non-empty finite set of players, and for each i N∈ , iA  is player i’s finite (and non-empty) set of pure 
actions, and iu  is player i ’s payoff function, a real-valued function on i
i N
A A
∈
= ∏ . The multi-linear 
extension of iu  to ( )A∆  is still denoted by iu . A member of ( )A∆  is called a (correlated) strategy 
profile. A coalition S is a non-empty member of 2N . Given a coalition S N⊆ , let S i
i S
A A
∈
= ∏ , and let 
{ }|S i N i S− = ∈ ∉  denote the complementary coalition. A member of ( )SA∆  is called an S-strategy 
profile. Given ( )q A∈ ∆  and S Sa A∈ , we define | ( )
S
Sq A⊆ ∆  to be | ( ) ( , )
S S
S S S
S
a A
q a q a a
− −
−
∈
= ∑ , and 
for simplicity we omit the subscript: |( ) ( )
S S
Sq a q a= . Given , . . ( ) 0,
Sa s t q a >S  we define 
( , )
( | )
( )
S S
S S
S
q a a
q a a
q a
−
− = . We say that ( )q A∈ ∆  is an uncorrelated strategy profile if for every 
1( , ..., )na a a A= ∈ , 1( ) ( ) * ... * ( )nq a q a q a= . Similarly, given a coalition S N⊂ , we say that 
( )S Sq A∈ ∆  is an uncorrelated S-strategy profile if for every S Sa A∈ , ( ) ( )S S S i
i S
q a q a
∈
= ∏ . Let 
( )IA A⊂ ∆  be the set of uncorrelated strategy profiles, and let ( )S SIA A⊂ ∆  be the set of uncorrelated 
S-strategy profiles. Given q IA∈ , we write ( , )
S Sq q q−=  where S Sq IA∈  and S Sq IA− −∈ . 
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Definition 2.1: An uncorrelated strategy profile q IA∈  is a k-strong Nash equilibrium if and only if for 
all coalitions S N⊆  satisfying S k≤ , and for every uncorrelated S-strategy profile S Sp IA∈ , there 
exists a player i S∈  such that ( ) ( , )i i S Su q u p q−≥ . Observe that a 1-strong Nash equilibrium is a Nash 
equilibrium, an n-strong Nash equilibrium is a strong Nash equilibrium (Bernheim et al., 1987), and 
that the set of (k+1)-strong Nash equilibria is a subset of the set of k-strong Nash equilibria. 
Definition 2.2: Given a coalition S N⊆ , we define an S-deviating scheme as a function 
: ( )S S Sd A A→ ∆ . Given a strategy profile q we say that )(Ap ∆∈  is an S-deviation from the strategy 
profile q, if there exists a deviating scheme Sd , such that for all a A∈ , we have 
( ) ( , ) ( | )
S S
S S S S S
b A
p a q b a d a b−
∈
= ∑ . Let ( , ) ( )D q S A⊆ ∆  denote the set of all S-deviations from q.  
Thus, a correlated strategy profile p is an S-deviation from another strategy profile q if the members 
of S, using a plan to correlate their play (which may depend on S-part of the recommendations SS Aa ∈ , 
chosen by a correlation device according to q), can induce the correlated strategy profile p when each 
member of the complementary coalition obeys his recommendation.  
Definition 2.3: ( )q A∈ ∆  is a k-strong correlated equilibrium if and only if for every coalition S N⊆  
satisfying S k≤ , and for every S-deviation ( , )p D q S∈ , there is a player i S∈ , s.t. ( ) ( )i iu q u p≥ .  
A k-strong correlated equilibrium is a correlated strategy profile, from which no coalition (with up to 
k players) has a joint deviation, which makes every member of the coalition better off. Observe that a 1-
strong correlated equilibrium is a correlated equilibrium, the set of (k+1)-strong correlated equilibria is 
a subset of the set of k-strong correlated equilibria, and that an  
n-strong correlated equilibrium is a strong correlated equilibrium as defined in Moreno & Wooders 
(1996). Other definitions of a strong correlated equilibrium in the literature differ in their assumptions 
about the gaming framework: whether the players of a deviating coalition can transmit private 
information and construct a new correlating device, and when coalitions plan their deviations: before 
(ex-ante) or after (ex-post) receiving the agreement recommendations. Ex-ante definitions can be found 
in Milgrom & Roberts (1996), Moreno & Wooders (1996), and Ray (1996), and ex-post definitions can 
be found in Einy & Peleg (1995), Ray (1998), and Bloch & Dutta (2007).  
In our framework of cheap-talk pre-play communication, a deviating coalition can use 
communication channels to share private information and to construct a new correlating device, and can 
plan deviations before, after or during the process of receiving their recommendations. At first look, the 
equilibrium defined in definition 2.3 seems to be resistant only against joint deviations that are planned 
 6
at the ex-ante stage.
5
 However, it turns out that in this framework an ex-ante k-strong correlated 
equilibrium is also an ex-post k-strong correlated equilibrium (see Heller, 2008). The intuition is that a 
decision to play an S-deviation is common knowledge in S . This allows the use of interactive 
epistemology (Aumann, 1976) to show that one can assume w.l.o.g. that all the deviators in a profitable 
ex-post S-deviation share the same posterior belief about the distribution of Sa . Using this, it is possible 
to “emulate” any profitable ex-post S-deviation by a profitable ex-ante S-deviation.  
Similar to the existing definitions of a strong correlated equilibrium, we assume that the deviating 
players are myopic: they do not take into account the possibility that there may be further deviations.6 
Definition 2.4: Given a coalition S N⊆ , we define an S-replacing scheme as a function 
: [0,1]S Sr A → . Given a strategy profile q and another strategy profile pɶ  (which we refer to as the 
“reaction” profile), we say that the profile )(Ap ∆∈  is an S-replacement of the strategy profile q with a 
reaction profile pɶ , if there exists a replacing scheme Sr , such that for all a A∈ , we have 
( )( ) 1 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
S S
S S S S S
b A
p a r a q a q b r b p a
∈
= − + ∑ ɶ . Let ( , , ) ( )R q S p A⊆ ∆ɶ  denote the set of all  
S-replacements of q with pɶ . 
Thus, a correlated strategy profile is an S-replacement of the profile )(Aq ∆∈  with a reaction profile 
p~ , if it is induced by an S-replacing scheme Sr  in the following process: 
• Given their recommendations SS Aa ∈  (chosen by a correlation device according to q) the players 
of S do a joint lottery. 
• With probability )(1 SS ar−  they obey their recommendations, and everyone plays according to q. 
• With probability )( SS ar  the correlation device is “replaced”, and everyone plays according to p~ . 
Definition 2.5: Given a correlated strategy profile ( )q A∈ ∆ , we say that an uncorrelated strategy 
profile q IA∈ɶ  is a k-strong punishing strategy profile (for q) if for every coalition S N⊆  satisfying 
S k≤  and for every S-deviation ( , )p D q S∈ɶ ɶ  (from q~ ), the following two conditions hold: 
• s. t . ( ) ( )i ii S u q u p∃ ∈ > ɶ .  
• For every S-replacement (of q with p~ ) ( , , )p R q S p∈ ɶ , s. t . ( ) ( )i ii S u q u p∃ ∈ ≥ .7  
                                                     
5 Because when considering whether the S-deviation p is profitable, one evaluates ui(q) and ui(p), without conditioning the utilities on ex-
post information about the recommendations aS. 
6 Assuming otherwise leads to the concepts of a coalition-proof Nash equilibrium (Bernheim et al., 1987) and of a correlated coalition-
proof equilibrium (defined in the literature that was referred to after definition 2.3)   
7 The second condition can be omitted if simultaneous messages are allowed (As discussed in Section 6). 
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A profile q is a k-strong punishable strategy profile if there exists a k-strong punishing profile (for q).  
    In our cheap-talk protocol (as described in the next section) the players construct together a 
correlation device that recommends each player what to play according to a k-punishable strategy 
profile q. The punishing strategy profile q~  is used to "deter" a coalition S (of up to k players) from 
using an "S-lie" (defined in Section 3): deviate while communicating with the members of S−  in order 
to “manipulate” the correlation device and induce a new correlation. The properties of our protocol 
(presented in Section 3) guarantee that any use of an S-lie is detected by a non-deviating player with 
probability 1λ <  at the ex-ante stage, and with probability 1 at the ex-post stage. If an S-lie is detected, 
then all the non-deviating players play the (uncorrelated) punishing strategy profile q~ , and the deviating 
players deviate from q~  to an S-deviation ),~(~ SqDp∈ .  
    The first condition guarantees that if the detecting probability λ  is large enough then every S-lie at 
the ex-ante stage is not profitable to at least one deviating player (as discussed after definition 2.6). 
     Assume that the players in S consider the use of an S-lie at the ex-post stage with probability ( )S Sr a  
(which depends on their recommendations SS Aa ∈ ). Because the S-lie is detected with probability 1, 
the resulting correlated strategy profile that is induced by the S-lie is an S-replacement: ( , , )p R q S p∈ ɶ . 
Thus the second condition guarantees that every S-lie at the ex-post stage is not profitable to at least one 
deviating player. 8 
Definition 2.6: Given a game G, a coalition S, a k-strong punishable strategy profile q with a k-strong 
punishing profile q~ , let the S-punishment be: ( ),
( , )
min max ( ) ( )S i iq q
p D q S i S
m u q u p
∈ ∈
= −ɶ
ɶ ɶ
ɶ , and let the minimal 
punishment be: ( ), ,
,
min Sq q q q
S N S k
m m
⊆ ≤
=ɶ ɶ . Let ( )
,
max ( ) ( )i iq
i N a A
w u a u q
∈ ∈
= −  be the maximal profit. Finally, let 
the minimal detecting probability ,0 1q qλ≤ <ɶ  be a solution (in the interval [0,1) ) to the equation 
, , ,(1 )q q q q q q qw mλ λ− ⋅ = ⋅ɶ ɶ ɶ . 
    Given a coalition S with up to k players and an S-deviation ( , )p D q S∈ɶ ɶ  from the punishing profile 
qɶ , one of the deviating players looses ( )max ( ) ( ) 0i i
i S
u q u p
∈
− >ɶ  if the profile q is replaced with pɶ . The  
S-punishment , 0
S
q qm >ɶ  is the minimal such loss for all possible S-deviations ( , )p D q S∈ɶ ɶ , and the 
minimal punishment , 0q qm >ɶ  is the minimal S-punishment for all coalitions with up to k players. All 
those expressions are positive due to the first condition in definition 2.5 (for every S-deviation 
                                                     
8 When considering whether an S-replacement is profitable, one evaluates ui(q) and ui(p), without conditioning the utilities on  
ex-post information about 
Sa . This is justified due to similar reasons as those discussed after definition 2.3 and in Heller (2008).  
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( , )p D q S∈ɶ ɶ , , ( ) ( )i ii S u q u p∃ ∈ > ɶ ). The expression ( )
,
max ( ) ( ) 0i iq
i N a A
w u a u q
∈ ∈
= − ≥  is the maximal 
profit a player may earn from replacing the profile q with another profile.  
    Assume that the players in S consider the use an S-lie at the ex-ante stage (before receiving their 
recommendations). If the S-lie, is undetected then the profit of any deviating player is at most qw , and if 
it is detected, then there exists a deviating player (say player i) that looses at least , 0q qm >ɶ . Let λ  be 
the probability that the S-lie is detected. Player i’s expected profit from the use of the S-lie is at most: 
,(1 ) q q qw mλ λ− ⋅ − ⋅ ɶ , and if ,q qλ λ> ɶ , then the equality in the definition of ,q qλ ɶ , 
, , ,(1 )q q q q q q qw mλ λ− ⋅ = ⋅ɶ ɶ ɶ , guarantees that player i looses (in expectation) if the S-lie is used.  
Definition 2.7: Given a game G (with n players), let G  be the cheap-talk extended game with the 
following pre-play talk phase: 
• The talk phase includes infinite number of turns.  
• According to some commonly known round-robin order, at each turn t, a communicating coalition 
( )S t N⊆  is chosen, and each of its members simultaneously sends a message to everyone in S(t).  
• The messages are taken from some finite alphabet M (that contains the null message φ ). 
Playing phase: After the talk phase, each player i simultaneously chooses an action in iA . 
We have defined the cheap-talk to be infinite in the spirit of Aumann & Hart (2003) who discuss  
2-player games, and show that any artificial restriction on the length of the conversation would limit the 
set of Nash equilibria in the extended game due to terminal effects propagating backwards (as in the 
finitely repeated Prisoner's Dilemma). Observe that in our definition all coalitions have substantial 
communication capabilities: every coalition S has an infinite number of turns in which it is the 
communicating coalition (S=S(t)) and its members can use those turns to share information, plan a 
deviating scheme and implement a correlating device. 
Denote the set of all 0t -period histories by 0
0 ( )
t
t t i S t
H M
< ∈
= ∏ ∏ , of all 0t -information sets of player 0i  
by 0
0
0 0, ( ) ( )
i
t
t t i S t i S t
H M
< ∈ ∈
= ∏ ∏  ( 00
i
tH  only includes the turns in which 0i  was in the communicating 
coalition), of all infinite histories by H∞  and of all infinite information sets of player 0i  by 
0iH∞ .  
A (behavioral) i-strategy in G  is a pair of measurable
9
 functions ),( iii gfc =  where: 
                                                     
9 , it tH H have the discrete topology (all sets are measurable) and ,
iH H∞ ∞  have the usual product topology (the smallest σ -field 
containing all finite cylinders). 
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• 
, ( )
: ( )i it
t i S t
f H M
∈
→ ∆∪  - A function according to which player i chooses his messages (when he 
is included in the communicating coalition, i.e. ( )i S t∈ ). 
• : ( )i i ig H A∞ → ∆  - A function according to which i chooses his action in the playing phase. 
We use the term protocol to denote an uncorrelated strategy profile in G  (an n-tuple ),...,( 1 nccc = ). 
Given a protocol c and a history h H∈ , we refer to 1 1( ( ), ..., ( ))n ng h g h  as the protocol’s action profile 
or as the (protocol’s) recommendations. 
Definition 2.8: Given a game G and a cheap-talk extension G , we say that a protocol c is finite if there 
exists a random variable *t  with a finite expected value (which we call the protocol’s length), such that 
for all i and for all *t t> ,
i
tf φ= . Therefore if all the players follow the finite protocol c, then the 
functions ig  depend non-trivially only on the first *t  turns. Observe that only the players who play 
according to c are bounded by the protocol finiteness. A deviating coalition S can continue to send non-
null messages in turns after 
*t . 
Definition 2.9: Given a game G and a cheap-talk extension G , we say that a protocol c is polite if for 
every turn t, at most one player sends a message different than φ  (the null message). 
Definition 2.10: Given a game G and a cheap-talk extension G , we say that a protocol c is using only 
private 2-player channels if for every turn t in which 2)( >tS , all the players send φ . 
Definition 2.11: Given a game G, a cheap-talk extension G  and a protocol c, let ( )cq A∈ ∆  denote the 
unique probability according to which actions are chosen at the playing phase, if all the players play in 
G  according to c. Let ( )q A∈ ∆  be a strategy profile. We say that a protocol c implements q if cq q= . 
Definition 2.12: Given a game G, a cheap-talk extension G , a protocol c, and a coalition S, we say that 
another protocol Sc  is an S-protocol-deviation (from c) if for every Si∉ , 
i i
Sc c=  (i.e. everyone outside 
S plays according to c, and only the members of S may deviate). 
3. A Universal Cheap-Talk Minority-Proof Protocol 
Theorem 3: Let G be a game with n players, let 2nk < , let ( )q A∈ ∆  be a k-strong correlated 
equilibrium, which is k-strong punishable, with rational parameters (i.e. ( )q a  is rational a A∀ ∈ ), and 
let G  be a cheap-talk extended game with a finite alphabet M (which depends on q). Then there exists a 
finite protocol c (an uncorrelated strategy profile in G ), which implements q and is a k-strong Nash 
equilibrium. Furthermore, c is a polite protocol that uses only 2-player private channels. 
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    A proof of Theorem 3:  We first give a detailed constructive description of our protocol c, and then 
prove that it implements q and that it is a k-strong Nash equilibrium in G . For simplicity of 
presentation, we assume n to be odd and 2 1n k= ⋅ + . Our protocol’s talk phase is divided into 
"constructing" phases and "lottery" phases.  
    The constructing phase is based on the k-private protocol presented in Ben-Or et al. (1988), which 
deals with fault-tolerant distributed computation. Their setup includes n players, each holding a secret 
input ix , who compute n polynomials ( )1( ,..., )i n i Nf x x ∈  (the outputs). Their protocol, if followed by all 
the players, allows each player i to obtain the value of 1( ,..., )i nf x x , while not acquiring any 
information about the values of the other outputs or inputs: the conditional distribution of ( )
,j j N j i
x
∈ ≠
 
and ( )1 ,( ,..., )j n j N j if x x ∈ ≠  given all the messages he received and sent (and his input ix ) is the same as 
the conditional distribution given only 1( ,..., )i nf x x  and ix . Moreover, if any coalition S (with up to k 
players) shares all the messages each of them received and sent (and their inputs ( )j j Sx ∈ ), then the 
resulting conditional distribution of ( )1( ,..., )j n j Sf x x ∈−  and ( )j j Sx ∈−  is the same as the conditional 
distribution given only ( )1( ,..., )j n l Sf x x ∈  and ( )j j Sx ∈ .  
     Let d ∈ N  be the common denominator of { }( )
a A
q a
∈
, let p∈ N  be a prime number larger than d  
and all iA  ( p d> , , ii p A∀ > ), let pZ  be the finite field of integers modulo p, and let the alphabet 
of G  be pM φ= ∪Z . Let ( )( )i i Nf x ∈  be polynomials over pZ  which satisfy the following conditions: 
• If x  is chosen uniformly over { }1,.., pd ⊆ Z  ¸ then ( )( )1 1Pr ( ),..., ( ) ,..., ( ,..., )i nn n i if x f x i i q a a= = , 
where 
j
j
ia A∈  is the ji -th action of player j . 
• If { }1,..., 1x d p∈ + − , then 1( ) ... ( ) 0nf x f x= = = .  
     At the beginning of each constructing phase, each player randomly chooses a secret input i ps ∈ Ζɶ , 
and the players communicate until each player i obtains the value of 1( ) ( ... )i i nf s f s s= + +ɶ ɶ ɶ , which is 
interpreted to be the protocol's recommendation for player i: if ( )if s l=ɶ  then he should play his l -th 
action in the playing phase.  
    In each lottery phase, the players make a joint lottery: with a large enough probability 1λ < , all the 
messages of the last constructing phase are revealed to everyone, each player verify that the 
recommendation he received is indeed equal to ( )if sɶ , and a new constructing phase is played; with 
probability 1-p nothing is revealed, the talk phase ends (i.e. since that turn, everyone sends null 
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messages), and the players play the last recommended action. If at any time during the talk phase a 
deviation from the protocol is revealed, then the players play a punishing strategy profile.  
   In the next sub-section we describe the details of the constructing phase, and in the following one we 
describe the details of the lottery phase. The constructive phase is adapted from Ben-Or et al. (1988), 
and repeated here to make this paper self contained (some technical details are omitted, see Ben-Or et 
al., 1988; Goldriech et al., 1987). 
The constructing phase: 
1) Choosing the secret action profile: Each player i N∈  randomly chooses his secret input i ps ∈ Zɶ . 
Let ps∈ Zɶ  be the sum of all inputs 1 ... ns s s= + +ɶ ɶ ɶ .
10 The random chosen action profile is the one 
interpreted by the values of ( )( ) ( )i i Nf s f s ∈=ɶ ɶ  (as described above). 
2) Sharing the secret: Each player i N∈  shares his secret input i ps ∈ Zɶ  among the other players. We 
begin by presenting a definition for sharing a secret input by a polynomial: 
Definition 3.1: Let ( )1 ,..., n py y ∈ Z  be some distinct ( i jy y≠ ) non-zero elements in pZ . We say that a 
secret input ps∈ Z  is shared among the players by a polynomial ( )l x : 
• (0)l s= . 
• Each player i receives the value of ( )il y  (i's "share" of the secret). 
• For each coalition S with up to k players ( S k≤ ), the set of shares ( )( )i i Sl y ∈  is completely 
independent from the secret input s  (i.e. the conditional distribution of s given ( )( )i i Sl y ∈  is the 
same as the prior distribution). 
In that case, we say that the polynomial ( )l x  encodes the secret input s . 
We now describe how the second sub-phase is done. For each player i N∈ : 
• Player i randomly chooses k  elements ( )( ),
1..
pi j
j k
b
=
∈ Zɶ . Let ( )il x  be the following polynomial 
over pZ : ( ) ( ) ( ),1 ,...
k
i i i i k
l x s b x b x= + + +ɶ ɶɶ .  
•   Player i sends player j his share: ( )i jl y . 
    At the end of this sub-phase, 
isɶ  is shared among the players by the polynomial ( )il x :  Every 
                                                     
10 All the operations described in this section (sums and multiplications) are operations in pz  (i.e. modulo p). 
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coalition S with up to k players ( i S∉ ) knows only k non-zero values of ( )( )i j i Sl y ∈ , which are 
completely independent of the secret value (0)i is l=ɶ . Observe that every coalition with k+1 players can 
compute the interpolation polynomial ( )il x  by sharing their 1k +  shares (as done later in the revealing 
sub-phase), and evaluate isɶ .  
3) Distributed Computations: In this sub-phase the players compute together the values of ( )( )i i Nf s ∈ɶ , 
while not revealing any information about the secret inputs ( )1,..., ns sɶ ɶ . The value of ( )if sɶ  can be 
computed from ( )1,..., ns sɶ ɶ  by a series of additions and multiplications. We have to show that we can 
share the result of each computation step (by a polynomial of degree k): adding two secret inputs, 
multiplying a secret input with a constant, and multiplying two secret inputs. We begin by showing it 
for the two simpler computation steps: 
• Addition of two secrets: Let , ps s′ ′′∈ Z  be two secret inputs that are shared by the polynomials (of 
degree k) ( ), ( )l x l x′ ′′ , i.e.: each player i knows the values of ( ), ( )i il y l y′ ′′ . In order to share s s′ ′′+ , 
each player i computes ( ) ( )i il y l y′ ′′+ . The resulting polynomial ( ) ( )l x l x′ ′′+  encodes s s′ ′′+ .  
• Multiplication of a secret with a known constant: Let ps′∈ Z  be a secret shared by the polynomial 
(of degree k) ( )l x′ . Let pb∈ Z  be a known constant. In order to share b s′⋅ , each player computes 
( )ib l y′⋅ . The resulting polynomial ( )ib l y′⋅  encodes b s′⋅ .  
As a corollary we have: 
Corollary 3.2 (Matrix multiplication): Let A be a constant n n⋅  matrix, and let each player i have a 
secret input i ps ∈ Z . Let 1( ,..., )ns s s=

, and define 
1( ,..., )nr r r=

 by: r A s= ⋅
 
. Then the players can 
jointly compute r

, such that the only information obtained by each player i is the value of ir .  
Proof: Matrix multiplication is equivalent to computing n linear functionals. The players can 
independently compute each functional 
ir  (by using the two computation steps described above: 
addition and multiplication by a constant), and reveal the outcome to player i (by sending him their 
shares of the polynomial that encodes the value of ir ). 
Now we show how the players can share the result of a multiplication of two secrets (by a 
polynomial of degree k). Let , ps s′ ′′∈ Z  be two secret inputs that are shared by the polynomials (of 
degree k) ( ), ( )l x l x′ ′′ . The sharing of s s′ ′′⋅  is done as follows: 
• Let ˆ( ) ( ) ( )h x l x l x′ ′′= ⋅ . Note that the free coefficient of the polynomial ˆ( )h x  is s s′ ′′⋅ . There are 
two problems to use ˆ( )h x  to encode s s′ ′′⋅ : its non-free coefficients are not random (for example, 
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( )h x  cannot be irreducible) and its degree is 2 k⋅  instead of k. We fix those problems by the 
following two sub-steps. 
• Randomization: Each player i randomly selects a polynomial ( )ip x  of degree 2 k⋅  with a zero free 
coefficient, and distributes its shares ( )i jp y  among the players. Then each player i computes 
1
ˆ( ) ( ) ... ( )i i n ih y p y p y+ + + . Let 1ˆ( ) ( ) ( ) ... ( )nh x h x p x p x= + + +  be the resulting polynomial. Note 
that ˆ( ) (0)h o h s s′ ′′= = ⋅ , and all other coefficient of ( )h x  are completely random. 
• Degree reduction: Let 2
0 1 2( ) ...
k
kh x h h x h x= + ⋅ + + , let 0 1 2( , ,..., )kh h h h=

, let ( )i is h y= , and let 
1( ,..., )ns s s=

. Let 0 1( ) ...
k
kg x h h x h x= + ⋅ + +  be the truncation of ( )h x , let 
0( , ..., , 0,..., 0)kg h h=

, let ( )i ir g y= , and let 1( ,..., )nr r r=

. Let ( ),i jB b=  be the n n⋅  matrix 
where ( ) 1,
i
i j jb y
−
= , and let P be the linear projection ( )0 2, ..., k Pα α ⋅ =  ( )0 , ..., , 0, ..., 0kα α . 
Observe that: h B s⋅ =
 
, h P g⋅ =
 
, and g B r⋅ =
 
. Since B is not singular (because the iy -s are 
distinct), we have: 1( )s B PB r−⋅ =
 
. By corollary 3.2, the players can compute r

, such that the only 
information obtained by each player i is the value of ir , and thus s s′ ′′⋅  can be shared by ( )g x . 
4) Revealing the recommendations: All the players send each player i their shares of the polynomial that 
encodes ( )if sɶ , he interpolates the polynomial, and evaluates the value of ( )if sɶ .  
The lottery phase: 
   Let q IA∈ɶ  be an uncorrelated punishing strategy profile (for q). Let λ be a rational number satisfying 
, 1q qλ λ< <ɶ  (where ,q qλ ɶ  is the minimal detecting probability as defined in 2.6). During the lottery 
phase, the players perform a joint lottery
11
 and with probability λ  all the players send everyone all the 
messages they sent and received in the last constructing-phase ("the revealing sub-phase").12 If a player 
finds out that there was a deviation in the constructing phase (i.e. a sender claims he sent a message 
a M∈  while a receiver claims he received another message b M∈ , or some player i did not do what 
he was supposed to do, like sending a wrong number in some computation step or choosing a 
polynomial with a wrong free coefficient), then he tells everyone about it, and then the (non-deviating) 
players stop communicating (i.e. send a null message for the rest of the infinite talk phase) and play the 
                                                     
11 Assuming λ=l/m (such that l and m are natural), the joint lottery can be done by each player simultaneously tells everyone a random 
chosen (0,.., 1)iy m∈ −  and comparing  y = (y1+…+yn) mod n  to l (y<l with probability λ). The lottery can also be implemented by a polite 
protocol by encoding the secret yi-s by polynomials and computing y. 
12 This can be done with only private 2-player channels: in each turn (according to some known round-robin order), player i tells player j a 
message he has sent/received in the last constructing-phase. After enough turns, all the players receive all the messages sent in the last 
constructing phase twice (once from the sender and once from the receiver). 
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punishing strategy profile qɶ .  With probability 1- λ, the content of the last constructing phase is not 
revealed, the (non-deviating) players stop communicating, and each player plays his part of the action 
profile of the last constructing phase. 
Remarks: 
• If all the players received a “0-recommendation” ( , ( ) 0ii f s∀ =ɶ , which happens when 
{ 1,..., 1}s d p∈ + −ɶ ), then they play the revealing phase with probability 1. If some players claim 
they received a 0-recommendation while others not, then they play the punishing strategy profile.  
• If at any time during the talk phase (not necessarily during the revealing sub-phase), a deviation 
from the protocol is revealed by a non-deviating player (for example, he receives a null message 
instead of a number), then the players play the punishing strategy profile qɶ .  
Proving the protocol is a k-strong Nash equilibrium: 
Let S be a coalition with up to k players. We have to show that there is no profitable deviation for S, 
i.e. that in every S-protocol-deviation Sc  there is a deviating player ,Si∈  such that ( ) ( )S
i i
c cu q u q≤ . 
The possible S-protocol-deviations can be divided into a few kinds: choosing numbers in pZ  non-
uniformly, sharing information, not following S-part of the action profile and S-lies (deviating while 
communicating with the members of S−  in order to change their recommendations). We show that 
none of those kinds (nor a combination of them) is profitable for S. 
Choosing numbers non-uniformly: In the beginning of the constructing phase, each player should 
randomly choose a secret input i ps ∈ Zɶ . The fact that the action profile depends only on the sum of 
those 
isɶ -s, guarantee that choosing isɶ  in any arbitrary way, does not affect the distribution of the action 
profile. Later, in the constructing phase, players should choose random coefficients for the polynomials 
( )ip x  (in the randomization sub-step). Choosing the values of those coefficients (or of the secret 
inputs) in any arbitrary way might be done in order to gain information about the action profile, but this 
is equivalent to sharing information (which is discussed in the next paragraph). 
     Sharing information: In this deviation, S members follow the protocol c when communicating with 
members of –S, but deviate when communicating among themselves: in turns when the communicating 
coalition is SS(t) ∈ , they send messages that contain some information about their secret inputs or 
about messages they received or sent in earlier parts of the protocol. Such sharing can be done in 
"silent" turns (when the players are supposed to send null messages).
13
 We now show that such sharing 
                                                     
13 For example, the deviating players can use some of the infinite number of turns after the protocol ends (when they are supposed to send 
only null messages) for sharing information. 
 15
does not give the deviating players any non-trivial information about S−  part of the action profile: 
( )( )j j Sf s ∈−ɶ . In each step of the constructing phase, each player i shares his secret information (his 
original secret input isɶ  and new inputs he obtains during the distributed computations sub-phase) by 
encoding them with random polynomials of degree k. The players of S know at most k shares of any 
encoding polynomial of a player in S− , and thus the coefficients of those polynomials, and specifically 
the free coefficient, are completely independent of their shares. Thus, the conditional distribution of 
( )( )j j Sf s ∈−ɶ  and ( )j j Ss ∈−ɶ  given all the messages the players of S received and sent (and the ( )j j Ss ∈ɶ ), are 
the same as the conditional distribution given only ( )( )j j Sf s ∈ɶ  and ( )j j Ss ∈ɶ  (Ben-Or et al., 1988). 
Not following their part of the action profile: The players of S may plan a deviation in the playing 
phase: playing according to an S-deviating scheme : ( )S Sd A A→ ∆  instead of following the protocol's 
action profile. However, the fact that q is a k-strong correlated equilibrium and that cqq =  guarantees 
that such a deviating scheme is not profitable for at least one player in S. 
S-lies: We define an S-lie as an S-protocol-deviation in which the players of S deviate while 
communicating with the non-deviating players of S− , and as a result a non-deviating player j S∉ −  
receives a different recommendation than ( )jf sɶ  (or does not receive a valid recommendation at all). 
Such S-lies can be used at the ex-ante stage (the first 3 sub-phases of the constructing phase when the 
players do not know their recommendation N Na A∈ ) or at the ex-post stage (the fourth sub-phase of the 
constructing phase).  
We first deal with S-lies at the ex-ante stage. With probability λ a revealing sub-phase is played after 
the constructing phase. In the revealing sub-phase, the members of S−  share their 1k +  (or more) 
shares ( )i jl y  of each random polynomial ( )il x  (of degree k) that was used to encode the secret inputs 
isɶ . This allows each non-deviating player to interpolate the coefficients of all those polynomials, and 
evaluate the true value of all isɶ . Thus the players in S−  can check whether any non-deviating player j 
received a different recommendation than ( )jf sɶ . Thus any ex-ante S-lie is detected with probability 
,q qλ λ> ɶ , and definition 2.6 (of the minimal detecting probability ,q qλ ɶ ) guarantees that any such S-lie is 
not profitable to at least one player in S. 
We now discuss S-lies at the ex-post stage. At least 1k +  non-deviating players in S−  send their 
true shares to each non-deviating player. Thus each player can interpolate his polynomial and evaluate 
( )jf sɶ  based only on the shares received from the non-deviating players. Thus any deviation at that 
stage (sending a wrong share) is detected with probability 1, and definition 2.5 (of k-strong punishing 
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profile) guarantees that the S-lie is unprofitable to at least one deviating player. QED (theorem 3). 
     The reader should note that our protocol is not a (k+1)-strong Nash equilibrium, as any coalition 
with 1k +  players can share their ( )i jl y -s and know the action profile: ( )( ) ( )i i Nf s f s ∈=ɶ ɶ . 
4. Non-Existence of a Universal Cheap-Talk (n/2)-Proof Protocol 
   In this section we show by way of examples that for every n, our result is tight: first for 2-player 
games (example 4.1) and then for general n-player games (example 4.2).  
    The following example (4.1) shows that there is a 2-player game Gˆ  and a (1-strong) correlated 
equilibrium qˆ  which is 1-strong punishable (with rational parameters), such that for every protocol cˆ  
(an uncorrelated strategy profile in the extended cheap-talk game), which implements qˆ , there is a 
player with a profitable deviation in the playing phase (thus there is no Nash equilibrium in the 
extended game with the same payoffs as qˆ ).  
Example 4.1 (based on Ben-Porath, 1998): Let Gˆ  be a “chicken” game, as described in Table 4.1 
(Alice is the row player and Bob is the column player). Let qˆ  be the following correlated equilibrium, 
which is 1-strong punishable with a punishing profile ),(~ 21 ddq = , as described in Table 4.2: 
        Table 4.1: “Chicken” payoffs                                    Table 4.2: The correlated equilibrium qˆ     
Bob Bob 
 
2e  2d  
 2e  2d  
1e  3,3 1, 4 
1e  
1
3
 1
3
 
Alice 
1d  4, 1 0, 0 
 
Alice 
1d  
1
3
 0 
     Assume to the contrary that there is a cheap-talk protocol c such that qˆ = cq  and that c is a Nash 
equilibrium in Gˆ  (the extended game). First we would like to note that because the game has only two 
players then both players completely know the history of messages:
14
 i.e. 21, ttt HHHt ==∀ , 
21
∞∞∞ == HHH . The protocol c determines a probability function cPr  over the set of infinite histories 
∞H . We show first that with probability 1 the recommendations to both players are pure: 
• Let IH H∞⊆  be the set of histories where both players mix their actions.
15 Observe that 
Pr ( ) 0c IH =  (because otherwise 0),(
21 >ddqc ).  
                                                     
14 W.l.o.g. we can ignore turns in which ( ) 1S t =  (i.e. turns in which a player communicates “with himself”).  
15 While our "minority-proof" protocol chooses a pure action profile (given a certain history of messages), in general protocols may choose 
a random action profile. 
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• Let IIH H∞⊆  be the set of histories where one player (say Alice) mixes while the other player (say 
Bob) plays a pure action. In every IIh H∈ , Alice has a profitable deviation in the playing phase: if 
Bob's action is 2d , then Alice deviates and play 1e , and if Bob's action is 2e , then Alice deviates 
and plays 1d . Thus, Pr ( ) 0c IIH =  (because we assume c to be a Nash equilibrium). 
     Let IIIH H∞⊆ be the set of histories where the recommended action profile is ( )1 2,e e . Observe that 
Pr ( ) 1/ 3c IIIH =  (because 
1 2ˆ( , ) 1/ 3q e e = ). We finish the proof by observing that both players have a 
profitable deviation from the protocol c in the playing phase of Gˆ : playing id  instead of ie  in every 
history in IIIH , contradicting our assumption that c is a Nash equilibrium in Gˆ . 
     Example 4.2 shows that for every n, there exists a game G with 2n players and a  
n-strong correlated equilibrium ( )q A∈ ∆  with rational parameters, which is n-strong punishable, such 
that in every finite protocol c that implements q (in the extended game G ), there is a coalition with n 
players that has a profitable coalitional-deviation. In particular there is no n-strong Nash equilibrium in 
the extended game with the same payoffs as q.  
    Example 4.2: Let G be a game with 2n players: {A1, …, An, B1, …, Bn}. Each player in A={A1,…, An}  
has two pure actions: {e
1
,d
1
}, and each player in B={B
1
,…, B
n
} has two pure actions: 2 2{ , }e d . The 
payoff of the game is: 
• If any two players in A played a different action (i.e. Ai played e1 while Aj played d1), or any two 
players in B played a different action, then all the players get 0. 
• Otherwise (all players in A played the same action as well as all the players in B), the payoff is the 
same as in example 4.1 (as described in table 4.3). 
Let q be the n-strong correlated equilibrium, which is n-strong punishable (with a punishing profile 
1 1 2 2( ,..., , ,..., )d d d d ), that is described in Table 4.4. Thus in q all players in A play the same action, as 
do all the players in B. 
                    Table 4.3: G payoff                                       Table 4.4: n-strong correlated equilibrium q       
1{ ,..., }nB B B=  1{ ,..., }nB B B=  
 2 2( ,..., )e e  2 2( ,..., )d d  
 2 2( ,..., )e e  2 2( ,..., )d d  
1 1( ,..., )e e  3 to everyone 
1 to 1{ ,..., }NA A  
4 to 1{ ,..., }NB B  
1 1( ,..., )e e  13
 1
3
 
A = 
{ }1,.., nA A  
1 1( ,..., )d d  
4 to 1{ ,..., }NA A  
1 to 1{ ,..., }NB B  
0 to everyone 
      
A 
 
1 1( ,..., )d d  13
 0 
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   Assume to the contrary that there is a finite cheap-talk protocol c (with length *t ) such that q= cq  and 
that c is an n-strong Nash equilibrium in G . We construct an "emulating" protocol in Gˆ  (the 2-player 
game of example 4.1), in which Alice and Bob talk by emulating what A={A1,…An} and B={B1,…,Bn} 
would have talked in the protocol c in G  and their recommendations in the playing phase emulate the 
recommendations of A and B. Due to example 4.1, one of the players (say Alice) has a profitable 
deviation (in the playing phase of Gˆ ). We end the proof by constructing a profitable deviation for A 
that includes information sharing among the members of A (after the original protocol ends), and 
playing a joint deviation in the playing phase that emulates Alice’s profitable deviation in Gˆ .  
    We now formally present the constructions described above. We begin by defining the alphabet and 
the order of communication in Gˆ : 
• The alphabet Mˆ  in Gˆ  is 
1..
ˆ
i n
M M
=
= ∏  (where M is the alphabet of G ). We relate a message of 
Alice ˆˆ Alicem M∈  to a vector of messages of A in G : 
1
ˆ ( ,..., )
nAlice A Am m m= , and similarly for Bob. 
• The communicating coalition in turn t in Gˆ  is determined according to the communicating coalition 
in turn t in G : 
{ } ( ) { }
ˆ( ) { } ( ) { }
{ , }
Alice S t A
S t Bob S t B
Alice Bob otherwise
∈

= ∈


 
In order to simplify notation, we relate to an information set of player 0i  in G : 
0 0 0
0 0 0
0 0, ( ) ( )
,
i i i i
t t t t
t t i S t i S t
h H h m
< ∈ ∈
∈ = ∏ ∏  as ( )1 100
0 0, ( )
,..., , ,...,
n ni A A B B
t t t t t
t t i S t
h m m m m
< ∈
= ∏  and let itm φ=  for each 
( )i S t∉  (i.e. we denote the message from a player which is not part of the communicating coalition in a 
given turn to be a null message), and similarly we relate to an information set in Gˆ : 
0 0 0
0 0 0
0 0, ( ) ( )
ˆ ˆˆ ˆ,i i i it t t t
t t i S t i S t
h H h m
< ∈ ∈
∈ = ∏ ∏  as 00
0 0, ( )
ˆ ˆ ˆ( , )i Alice Bobt t t
t t i S t
h m m
< ∈
= ∏  and let ˆ itm φ=  for each ˆ( )i S t∉ . 
     We continue by relating each information set of Alice in Gˆ  with a set of information sets for each 
iA A∈  (and similarly for Bob and B): 
• Given an information set of Alice in turn 0t : 0
0
ˆ, ( )
ˆ ˆˆ ˆ( , )Alice Alice Bob Alicet t t t
t t Alice S t
h m m H
< ∈
= ∈∏ , where 
( )1ˆ ,..., nAlice A At t tm m m=  and ( )1ˆ ,..., nBob B Bt t tm m m= , let the dual information set of jA  in turn 0t  be 
∏
∈<
=
)(,0
11
0
),...,,,...,(
tSAtt
B
t
B
t
A
t
A
t
A
t
j
nnj
mmmmh  assuming that the following constraint holds: if ( )i S t∉  then 
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i
tm φ= . If the constraint does not hold, we say that 
Alice
th 0
ˆ  does not have a dual information set for 
player jA  in G. Similarly, given the information sets of the members of A in turn 0t , ( )0 1..
iA
t
i n
h
=
 
(where ∏
∈<
=
)(,0
11
0
),...,,,...,(
tSAtt
B
t
B
t
A
t
A
t
A
t
i
nni
mmmmh ), let 
0
ˆAlice
th  be the dual information set of Alice in turn 
0t : 0
0
ˆ, ( )
ˆ ˆˆ ˆ( , )Alice Alice Bob Alicet t t t
t t Alice S t
h m m H
< ∈
= ∈∏ . We similarly define dual information sets of Bob and B. 
• The dual information sets of the infinite histories and infinite information sets are similarly defined. 
    Let 
1 1
( ,..., , ,..., )
n nA A B Bf f f f  be the functions according to which the players in G  (who follow the 
protocol c) talk in the talking phase (
, ( )
: ( )i it
t i S t
f H M
∈
→ ∆∪ ), and let 
1 1
( ,..., , ,..., )
n nA A B Bg g g g  be the 
(measurable) functions according to which they play in the playing phase ( )(: iii AHg ∆→∞ ). We now 
construct ( )ˆ ˆˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ( , ) ( , ), ( , )Alice Bob Alice Bob Alice Bobc c c f f g g= = , the “emulating” protocol in Gˆ : 
• We define the talking function of Alice 
ˆ, ( )
ˆ ˆ ˆ: ( )Alice it
t Alice S t
f H M
∈
→ ∆∪  in turn t (such that 
ˆ( )Alice S t∈ ) to be: 
1 1ˆ ˆ( ) ( ( ),..., ( ))
n nAlice Alice A A A A
t t tf h f h f h= , where 
iA
th  is the dual information set of 
iA  and if )(tSAi ∉  then )(
ii A
t
A hf  is defined to be null.
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 We similarly define the talking function 
of Bob. Observe that the constraint mentioned earlier in the definition of a dual information set (if 
( )i S t∉  then itm φ= ) always holds (as can be shown by induction on t).  
• We define the playing function of Alice ˆˆˆ : ( )Alice Alice Aliceg H A∞ → ∆  to be: 
1 1
1
ˆ ˆ ˆ( ) ( ) ... ( )ˆˆ ( )
i i n nA A A A A A
Alice Alice g h if g h g hg h
d otherwise
∞ ∞ ∞
∞
 = =
= 

,  
where 
iAh∞  is the dual information set of 
iA . We similarly define Bob’s playing function.  
Observe that qˆ = cq ˆ . Thus due to example 4.1 one of the players (say Alice) has a profitable 
deviation from cˆ  in the playing phase of Gˆ . Let ˆˆˆ : ( )Alice Alice Aliceg H A∞ → ∆
ɶ  be Alice playing function in 
her profitable deviation. Observe that cˆ  is finite (and has the same length *t  as c), and therefore ˆ
Alicegɶ  
depends (non-trivially) only on 
*
ˆ Alice
tH  (since after *t , the players only send null messages): 
*
ˆˆˆ : ( )Alice Alice Alicetg H A→ ∆
ɶ .  
   We finish the proof by constructing a profitable A-protocol-deviation contradicting our assumption 
                                                     
16 Originally, )(
ii A
t
A hf  is defined only for turns in which )(tSi∈ . 
 20
that c is an n-strong Nash equilibrium in G . In the A-protocol-deviation the players in A begin by 
talking according to the original protocol c until it ends (i.e. until *t ). After c is over, they use some turns 
in which ( )S t A=  (when they should only send null messages according to the protocol) to fully share 
their sets of information (i.e. at the end of those turns each player in A knows { }1
* *
,...,
kA A
t th h  which are the 
dual information sets of 
*
ˆAlice
th  in Gˆ ). Therefore, afterwards they can evaluate and play the A-strategy 
induced by 
*
ˆˆ ( )Alice Alicetg h
ɶ  (i.e. they all play 
*
ˆˆ ( )Alice Alicetg h
ɶ  and if it is a mixed strategy they make a joint 
lottery and play together according to the result). Observe that every player in A earns from the deviation 
the same profit that Alice earns from the deviation in Gˆ  (thus it is a profitable A-deviation). 
Remarks about example 4.2:  
• Observe that our requirement in the definition of cheap-talk (definition 2.7) that each coalition S has 
an infinite number of turns in which ( )S S t=  is necessary for the proof of example 4.2. If in a 
different pre-play communication framework the players can limit the private communication 
channels of sub-coalitions (for example, at some point the grand coalition can decide that the talking 
phase ends, and the playing phase is immediately played), then the proof of example 4.2 does not 
hold. 
• Our requirement that c is finite can be replaced by a requirement that the communication order gives 
the players of A and the players in B enough opportunities to secretly share information. For 
example, requiring that the order of the communicating coalitions ( )S t  is such that between any 
two turns in which the players of A communicate with the players of B, there is a turn in which 
( )A S t=  and a turn in which ( )B S t= . 
5. An Example for Applicability – a 5-Player “Chicken” Game 
    In this section, we study a 5-player “chicken” game, in which the use of our "minority-proof" 
protocol can give a substantial gain to all players. Let G be the following game: 
• Each of the 5 players has two pure actions: s ("swerve") and d ("drive straight") 
• The payoff function is: 
o If all players play s, then everyone gets 4. 
o If up to 2 players play d, then those who played d get 5 while the others get 2. 
o If more than 2 players play d, then everyone gets 0. 
The presence of a fair mediator allows the players to achieve the following correlated strategy profile q: 
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• With probability 3/ 8 37.5%= : all the players play s. 
• For each of the 10 couples (i,j) where i j≠ , with probability 1/16 6.25%− : (i,j) play d, while the 
other players play s. 
One can verify that: 
• The profile q is a 2-strong correlated equilibrium with a symmetric payoff of 3.5  which is the best 
2-strong correlated equilibrium symmetric payoff. 
• The profile q is 2-strong punishable (with the punishing strategy ( , , , , )q d d d d d=ɶ ).  
• The payoff of q is strictly better than the best symmetric payoff in the convex hull of Nash equilibria 
– 3.2. (achieved by choosing each of the ten couples (i,j) with probability 10%, and playing the Nash 
equilibrium in which (i,j) play d and the others play s.)  
   We now wish to compare our protocol with the existing protocols in the literature (Barany, 1992; 
Ben-Porath, 1998; Ben-Porath, 2003; Forges, 1990; Gerardi, 2004), when a fair mediator does not exist, 
and the players can only use cheap-talk. These protocols can implement q, but only as a  
(1-strong) Nash equilibrium. This implementation is "weak" in the sense that it is possible for two 
players (for example, players 1 and 2 in Ben-Porath, 2003) to jointly interfere with the protocol and 
guarantee a payoff of 5 for themselves (and 2 to the other players). Contrary to that, the use of our 
protocol gives a "stronger" implementation as a 2-strong Nash equilibrium. An analog example can be 
devised for any odd number of players. 
6. Concluding Remarks: 
1) Two possible extensions of our protocol are: 
• Implementing a k-coalition-proof correlated equilibrium as a k-coalition-proof Nash 
equilibrium (Bernheim et al., 1987) in the extended cheap-talk game.  
• Implementing a k-strong (or k-coalition-proof) correlated equilibrium of a Bayesian game. 
2) Ex-ante and ex-post strong correlated equilibria: A related question is the relation between the 
various sets of strong correlated equilibria that were defined in the literature. In Heller (2008) we 
prove that the set of ex-ante strong correlated equilibria (as defined in Moreno & Wooders, 1996) is 
included in the set of ex-post strong correlated equilibria (as defined in any of the alternative 
definitions of Einy & Peleg, 1995; Ray, 1998; Bloch & Dutta, 2007, Heller, 2008). This is different 
than the coalition-proof case where it is known that there is no inclusion relationship between the 
sets of ex-ante and ex-post coalition-proof correlated equilibria (as discussed in the referred papers). 
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3) A simultaneous protocol: The implementation of a simultaneous protocol depends on the ability 
of players to send and receive messages exactly at the same time. This may be problematic in some 
real-world environments, and thus we have chosen to construct our protocol in the more robust 
form of a polite protocol. If simultaneous messages are possible, one can alter the last sub-phase of 
the constructing phase of our protocol (“revealing the recommendations”) into a simultaneous one, 
by sending the shares of the polynomials that encode the recommendations simultaneously to all 
players.17 This allows weakening definition 2.5 of a k-strong punishing strategy profile by omitting 
the second condition, and only requiring the first condition ( ( , ), , ( ) ( )i ip D q S i S u q u p∀ ∈ ∃ ∈ >ɶ ɶ ɶ ). 
This weaker definition, allows the implementation of a larger set of k-strong correlated equilibria. 
4) Cryptographic protocols: In situations in which the players are computationally restricted and one 
assumes the existence of “one-way” functions, it is possible to construct a protocol that implements 
any k-strong correlated equilibrium as a k-strong Nash equilibrium, without the restriction / 2k n< , 
as discussed in Goldreich et al. (1987), Gossner (1998), Dodis et al. (2000), Urbano and Vila 
(2002), Lepinski et al. (2004), Abraham et al. (2006), and the references within.  
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